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PROBATION IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS
OF FLORIDA
VERNON W. CLAu*
NATURE AND USE

Probation is the procedure whereby any court having original
jurisdiction of criminal actions1 may withhold the imposition of sentence upon a defendant who has been found guilty of a non-capital
crime and place him under the supervision of the Florida Parole
Commission, subject to lawful conditions set by the court. 2 The
finding of guilt may have been by verdict or plea, and there need not
have been an adjudication. Discretion in the use of probation is
granted the court "if it appears ...that the defendant is not likely
again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends
of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant [should] . . .suffer the penalty imposed by law ...."3
The object of probation is the expeditious return of the probationer to law-abiding citizenship. Although technically restrained by
the lawful conditions of the court 4 and subjected to supervision, 5 he
suffers no imprisonment 6 and enjoys a freedom conducive to restoration of respectability.7 The circumstances in which he finds himself
have been created by judicial, legislative, and administrative efforts
seeking to assure benefit to the probationer and to the social order
in which he lives. However, the primary responsibility for seeing
OA.B.E. 1932, University of Florida; M.A. 1939, New York University; LL.B.
1941, University of Florida; former District Probation and Parole Supervisor, Florida Parole Commission; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. The procedures of the juvenile courts of Florida are not included in this
discussion; such procedures are governed primarily by FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1959)
and, according to FLA. STAT. §949.01 (1959), are not affected by the law of probation as administered in the criminal courts.
2. FLA. STAT. §§948.01,.011 (1959).
3. FL^. STAT. §948.01 (3) (1959).
4. Ex parte Bosso, 41 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949); Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 586,
15 So. 2d 293 (1943).
5. FLA. STAT. §§948.01 (3),(4), 948.02(2) (1959).
6.

FLA. STAT. §948.01 (3) (1959).

7.

FLA. STAT. §§948.02-.04 (1959).
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that these efforts are not frustrated lies with the probationer.
Probation, in contradistinction to imprisonment, provides time
and opportunity to regain dignity as an individual by worth-while
accomplishment in the cultural and social life of the community. In
addition, the economic liability of the state is minimized. In 1960,
the cost of supervision of a probationer was thirty-seven cents per
day, as compared to a daily cost of $2.66 to maintain a prisoner.8
The probationer is a member of a segment of society that supports
thousands of dependents while earning and spending several million
dollars annually.9 In brief, he is the beneficiary of a system designed
to accomplish the object of conserving human resources with care,
certainty, and celerity.
Because of these advantages, the trial courts of Florida have increasingly used this judicial procedure to restore the lives of those
who have run afoul of the criminal laws. Since the establishment of
the Florida Parole Commission' 0 more than 13,000 people have been
placed on probation, progressing from 335 in 1942 to 1,960 in 1960.11
Evidence of the desirability of the probation system is found in the
fact that in the nineteen years of the operation of the commission
approximately ninety per cent of the probationers have successfully
completed their periods of probation or are presently in the process
2

of doing so.'

PAROLE AND PROBATION DISTINGUISHED

Parole is a type of release that is often confused with probation.

Lawyers as well as laymen frequently use the term in situations involving probation, and the same mistake is often made by trial
courts without criticism by the Florida Supreme Court. s Important
features distinguish parole from probation, however, and the two
terms should not be used interchangeably.
Parole is a procedure by which a duly convicted defendant who
has been sentenced and who has served a part of the term imposed
8.

FLA. PAROLE COMM'N, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1961).

9.

Id. at 11.

10. The Florida Parole Commission was created by the 1941 Florida Legislature
under the authority of FLA. CONsT. art XVI, §32, adopted in 1940. Although its
operation began in the latter part of 1941, its first full year of operation was 1942.
11. FLA. PAROLE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 10.
12. Id. at 2.
13. E.g., State ex rel. Lee v. Coker, 80 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1955); Bronson v.
State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So. 2d 873 (1941). In Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla.
1953), the Court commented upon a circuit judge's erroneous use of the word
parole. See Ex parte Bosso, 41 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949), in which the Florida Supreme
Court used the terms parole and probation interchangeably in a situation having
to do with probation.
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under a judgment of conviction is released from prison and allowed
to complete his sentence under supervision.'4
A probationer and a parolee in Florida have little in common
except that each is under the supervision of the Florida Parole
Commission.' 5 The power to grant, set conditions for, and revoke
parole rests exclusively with the commission.6 The parolee has
served a part of his sentence in prison, and the parole period is deemed
a continuation of the sentence. In the absence of a revocation of
parole 1" or the grant of a pardon,"8 the parole period cannot be
terminated before expiration of the sentence. Revocation of parole
results in return of the parolee to prison to complete the part of the
sentence remaining unserved at the time parole was granted.19 These
characteristics of parole are foreign to probation.
POWER TO GRANT

PROBATION

The courts of the State of Florida having original jurisdiction of
criminal actions have the statutory power to grant probation, 20 and
at present this power is vested exclusively with these courts. The legislature is empowered by the Florida Constitution to authorize the
parole commission to grant probation, 21 but it has wisely refrained
from doing so. The exercise of such authority on a broad scale by
the parole commission would be tremendously expensive and would
necessitate a major revision of the objectives, organization, and operation of the present commission.22
ELIGIBILITY FOR PROBATION

Type of Crime
The Florida statute concerned with eligibility for probation specifies that a defendant in a criminal case who has been found guilty
of a non-capital crime may be granted this type of release.23 The
perpetrator of a crime punishable by life imprisonment was ineligible
14. See Marsh v. Garwood, supra note 13; Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 586, 15
So. 2d 293 (1943).
15. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (4) (1959) as to a probationer, §947.20 as to a parolee.
16. FLA. STAT. §947.16 (2) (1959).
17.

FLA. STAT. §947.24

(1959).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
parole

See Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1953).
FLA. STAT. §947.23 (1) (1959).
FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1) (1959).
FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §32.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 947 (1959) for the statutory set-up pertaining to the
commission.
23. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1) (1959).
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for probation until the elimination of this exception in 1959.24 Conviction for a repeated violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law
25
also precludes probation.
Determination of Guilt
A finding of guilt is required in order to qualify a defendant for
probation. 26 This finding may be accomplished by the verdict of a
jury, the verdict of a court trying the case without a jury, a plea of
2
nolo contendere, or a plea of guilty. 7
Prior to 1959 there was much to support the assumption that an
adjudication of guilt by the court also was a prerequisite to the granting of probation. 28 In that year, however, the legislature definitized
the law by providing that the determination of whether an adjudication of guilt shall be made before the granting of probation lies
within the discretion of the trial court. 29 Presumably, an important
motive behind this legislation was the desire to facilitate the rehabilitation of the probationer.30 Upon an adjudication of guilt a defendant
suffers a conviction 3' and may thereby forfeit certain legal privileges,
some of which are often referred to as civil rights.32 Thus, rehabilitation may be seriously jeopardized from the beginning of the probationary period by subjection to the embarrassment and inconvenience resulting from loss of privileges. There is no doubt that the
24. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1957). The elimination of this exception relieved the
judiciary of the troublesome question concerning the legality of probation with
reference to a statute providing for imprisonment for life or for a lesser term,
in the alternative. A negative answer was given in 1942 by the Supreme Court
of Florida by a 4-3 decision. State v. Taylor, 151 Fla. 296, 9 So. 2d 708. The
Court expressed serious discontent with this decision one year later, however,
although the decision was not in issue. Parrish v. State, 153 Fla. 105, 14 So. 2d
171.
25. FA. STAT. §398.22 (1959).

26.

FLA. STAT.

§948.01 (1) (1959).

27. Ibid.
28. FLA. STAT. §924.06 (1957) permitted a probationer to appeal from a judgment of conviction even though sentence had been suspended. This statute and
§921.05 (2), still in effect, which requires a judgment of guilt as a prerequisite to
sentence, were logically conducive to the view that a judgment was a prerequisite to probation, although no Florida statute or appellate judicial decision expressly so provided. Apparently trial practice commonly was based upon this
assumption, although there is evidence of some divergence from this position. See
Letter, Judge John U. Bird, 32 FA. B.J. 528 (1958).
29. FA. STAT. §948.01 (1) (1959).
S0. Apparently the sentiment expressed in the letter by Judge Bird found
legislative approval.
31. Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1958); Weathers v. State, 56 So.
2d 536 (Fla. 1952); Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930).
32. See note 148 infra and text pertaining thereto.
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spawning of resentment is poor preparation for rehabilitation. On
the other hand, elimination of the necessity for an adjudication of
guilt may create perplexing problems in the future. These problems
will receive attention in subsequent phases of this discussion.
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Fines
The penalty provided by some criminal statutes is a sentence
of imprisonment for not less than a specified period. 33 Conceding that
a sentence cannot be less than the statutory minimum, suspension of
imposition of sentence is a prerequisite to probation,34 and such statutes should not be construed to obligate the trial court to impose a
sentence. Denial of probation by statutory implication bespeaks arbitrariness.
More difficulties are encountered in situations involving criminal
statutes that provide only a fine as punishment. 35 There is no statutory provision expressly prohibiting probation in such situations, and
the use of this procedure can be reconciled with some of the terminology of the probation law of Florida. 38 But the statute setting the
limits of the period of probation 37 apparently is concerned only
with probation after conviction for the violation of a statute that
provides a possible sentence of imprisonment.38 An additional difficulty in using probation in such a case is presented by the sparsity of
statutory provisions for judicial recourse in case of violation of
probation. Although it may be contended that the statute providing
that execution of a sentence imposing a fine 39 may be issued as on a
judgment in a civil action, this procedure probably would prove
impractical in many cases. Clarification of the law in this area is
needed.
PROCEDURE IN GRANTING PROBATION

Pre-sentenceInvestigation and Hearing
After guilt has been established in a criminal case, either by plea
or verdict, the trial court has the authority to hear and determine
33. E.g., FLA. STAT. §811.14 (1959).
34. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (3) (1959).
35. E.g., FLA. STAT. §784.02 (1959).
36. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1) excepts only crimes punishable by death from the
offenses for which eligibility for probation may be established.
37. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959).
38. FLA. STAT. §775.07 (1959) provides, inter alia, that if the penalty provided
for a misdemeanor is a fine alone, the court may, in its discretion, impose a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed 60 days in default of payment of the fine. It
is to be noted, however, that here the sentence has been imposed rather than
suspended.
39. FLA. STAT. §922.02 (1959).
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the question of probation. 4° The court, in its discretion, may refer
the case to the parole commission for a pre-sentence investigation
prior to the hearing. 41 The purpose of this investigation is to gather
information that the court can use in deciding whether sentence
should be imposed or probation granted. The commission submits
its recommendations in a written report that covers the circumstances
of the offense, the criminal record, the social history, and the present
condition of the defendant. 42 The court uses the report as it sees
fit and is not bound by the commission's recommendations.
The hearing is generally of an informal nature. 43 The court seeks
to obtain all available information that may be of assistance in
determining the proper disposition of the case and does not adhere
to technical rules of procedure in accomplishing this end. If it
appears that the defendant is not likely to engage in a criminal course
of conduct again and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society
do not require that he shall suffer imposition of sentence, the court
4 1
may suspend imposition of sentence and place him on probation.
Suspension of Sentence
In Florida the term suspension of the imposition of sentence
refers to suspension of the pronouncement of sentence by the court,
as distinguished from pronouncement of sentence and suspension of
its execution. 4 5 Probation is concerned only with the former.40
This procedural step has an interesting history. For many years
trial courts in Florida suspended imposition of sentence by either
of two methods. 47 A court would defer the passing of sentence from
day to day and from term to term without imposing any conditions
the violation of which would be cause for revocation of the deferment order;48 or a similar deferment of sentencing would be accompanied by specification of conditions to be met by the convicted person
49
after his release.
40.
41.

FLA. STAT.

§948.01 (1) (1959).

FLA. STAT. §948.01 (2) (1959).

The Supreme Court of Florida used the

term pre-sentence investigation in Caston v. State, 58 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1952), and
Ard v. State, 91 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1956).
42.

FLA. STAT. §948.01 (2) (1959).

43. The writer is a former district supervisor for the Florida Parole Commission.
His personal experiences and observations form a basis for the comments concerning the practical operation of the law of probation.
44. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (3) (1959).
45. Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. E.g., Pinkney v. State, 160 Fla. 884, 37 So. 2d 157 (1948).
49. E.g., Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947).
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Neither of these early release procedures involved an order of
probation. Both resulted in suspension of sentence for an indefinite
period of unsupervised freedom for the defendant. 50 Both could be
revoked by the court, and in the case of the suspended sentence with
no condition attached the revocation could be made without granting
the defendant a hearing on the question of his good behavior.51
Upon revocation of the order suspending imposition of sentence
under these procedures, the court assumed the authority to impose
any sentence it could have imposed originally. In Brill v. State52 the

order suspending imposition of sentence was revoked more than seven
years after it was made, and a sentence of six months' imprisonment
was imposed. This sentence was the maximum that could have been
imposed at the time of suspension of the imposition of sentence.
In Moutos v. State53 a sentence was imposed after having been suspended for ten years. In Helton v. State,54 twelve years after the
imposition of sentence was suspended a sentence of four years' imprisonment was imposed for a crime with a maximum imprisonment
period of five years. These situations illustrate the injustice of a system that allows indefinite deferment of sentence and unrestricted
power to terminate the deferment by imposition of sentence. Treatment of this nature provides a breeding place for contempt for the
law.
Deferment of sentence for adequate cause was not a practice
novel to our forebears. The trial courts of England had followed
this procedure for a long time before it was included in the jurisprudence of the newly independent American states. 55 As early as
1890 the Florida Supreme Court expressly recognized with approval
the practice among trial courts in Florida of temporarily suspending
imposition of sentence for a sufficient cause, such as the pendency of
another indictment.55 The prime significance of the Court's position
was that its approval was not predicated upon statutory or inherent
authority of the trial court but upon the fact that the procedure was
a common practice in the trial courts.
As the years passed the Supreme Court of Florida gradually buttressed its position in an amazing fashion. This position, originally
50. State v. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7 (1959) (citing a series of Florida cases so
holding); Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
51. Collingsworth v. Mayo, 77 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1955); Pinkney v. State, 160
Fla. 884, 37 So. 2d 157 (1948).
52. 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947).
53. 49 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1950).
54. 106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958). As will be developed subsequently, in this case
the Florida Supreme Court called a halt to this procedure.
55. See Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
56. Ex parte Williams, 26 Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890).
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approved and reaffirmed largely by dicta,5 was eventually established
as law by Carnagio v. State,58 decided in 1982. This case, however,
began a trend apparently not anticipated by the Court in its earlier
statements. In Carnagio the trial court's order suspending the imposition of sentence "from day to day and term to term" was approved, although the sentence had remained suspended only until
the next term of court. An order suspending sentence for an indefinite period of time would have been consistent with this holding,
and eventually this possibility became reality. The practice of suspending imposition of sentence indefinitely, either with or without
conditions, became well established and received judicial approval
upon several occasions.5 9
In 1941, the Court emphasized its disregard for the historical
derivation of a trial court's power to suspend imposition of sentence. 60
The Court extended the basis supporting this procedure by stating:
"There is nothing in the statutes to limit or restrain the court's inherent power to suspend pronouncement of sentence, once having
entered a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty .... 61sThus,

in the course of approximately fifty years, a procedure adopted informally as a matter of convenience and practice by trial courts in
Florida suddenly assumed the enviable stature of an inherent power
of the courts.
62
Florida's first probation law was enacted by the 1941 Legislature.
This law empowered the trial courts, in appropriate cases, to suspend
the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on probation
under the supervision of the parole commission. 63 A definite limitation on the length of the probationary period was specified.64 The
effect of the law was to create a new system of supervised probation
with built-in restrictions and safeguards against abuse. The contrast
of this law with the practices that preceded it was startling.
The 1941 probation law apparently was not initially considered
by the Supreme Court of Florida as affecting its previously recognized
concept of the inherent power of the trial court to suspend sentence
indefinitely and grant unsupervised freedom. 65 Consequently, for a
57. Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 2d 459 (1907); Ex parte Williams,
26 Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890).
58. 106 Fla. 209, 143 So. 162 (1932).
59. Collingsworth v. Mayo, 77 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1955); Pinkney v. State, 160
Fla. 884, 37 So. 2d 157 (1948); Bronson v. State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So. 2d 873 (1941);
Campbell v. State, 131 Fla. 135, 179 So. 137 (1938).
60. Bronson v. State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So. 2d 873 (1941).
61. Id. at 193, 3 So. 2d at 875.
62. FLA. STAT. ch. 948 (1941).
63. FLA. STAT. §§948.01 (3), (4) (1959).
64. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959).
65. Collingsworth v. Mayo, 77 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1955); Pinkney v. State, 160
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period of years there existed in Florida two systems of qualified
freedom that could be granted a defendant by a trial court-one
arising from a court-approved practice of granting unsupervised
freedom for an indefinite period, the other provided by statute and
consisting of supervised probation with definitely specified limits.
In 1958 the First District Court of Appeal dealt the indefinite deferment of a sentence a crucial blow. In the illuminating case of
Bateh v. State,60 the court reviewed the origin of the procedure, its
historical limitations, and its judicially created dignity as an inherent
power of a trial court. The court made the significant observation
that in none of the cases through which the practice had evolved had
an appellate court been called upon to test its conformity to state
or federal constitutional guarantees.
The court pointed out that an order indefinitely suspending the
imposition of a lawful sentence has the effect of nullifying the law
providing for the sentence, or of placing the defendant on probation,
or of awarding him a conditional pardon. The court observed that
such an order is inconsistent with the law of Florida vesting the lawmaking authority in the legislative branch of the government and
the power to pardon in the executive branch. Recognition was accorded the power of a trial court to suspend temporarily the imposition of sentence from time to time or from term to term for the purpose of dealing with certain matters arising between verdict and
judgment. Valid bases for the exercise of this power include determination of motions, pendency of other charges, and acquisition
of the information necessary for the imposition of a just sentence.
The indefinitely deferred sentence, however, was condemned as illegal,
thus leaving the statutory system of supervised probation as the sole
procedure available to the trial court after suspension of imposition
of sentence for other than temporary purposes.
A few months after the Bateh decision by the district court, the
Florida Supreme Court considered the same issue in Helton v. State.67
The decision of the lower appellate court in Bateh received unqualified approval. The Supreme Court refrained from deciding whether
the practice of suspending the imposition of sentence indefinitely was
lawful before enactment of the probation law in 1941. The Court
stated, however, that since that date suspension of the imposition of
sentence can be exercised by a trial judge only under the provisions
of the probation law, subject to the exceptions for temporary purposes
recognized in the Bateh opinion. Acknowledging that its position
was inconsistent with some of its prior decisions 6s rendered after the
Fla. 884, 37 So. 2d 157 (1948).
66. 101 So. 2d 869 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
67. 106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958).
68. Cases cited note 65 supra.
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enactment of the probation law, the Court modified them accordingly.
When Bateh reached the Supreme Court the following year, the decision of the district court was affirmed, the Helton case serving as a
guiding precedent. 69
In the two Bateh opinions, as well as in Helton, the appellate courts
considered a perplexing Florida statute passed in 1957.70 This statute
provides that when sentence has been withheld and has not been
altered for a period of five years, the defendant shall not thereafter
be sentenced for conviction of the same crime. The statute was not
applicable in either Helton or Bateh, since it did not become effective
until after entry of the orders under attack. The expressed attitudes
of the courts concerning this statute are important, however, since
its finally determined scope may substantially affect the law of probation.
The district court in Bateh felt no uncertainty about some aspects
of the statute. In its opinion the act is not a legislative recognition
of an inherent power in a trial court to suspend imposition of sentence indefinitely. The legislature was said to be unable to vest inherent power in the trial courts by recognition of a judicial practice,
since the power vests only by virtue of the nature of the judiciary.
The court also commented that it did not interpret this statute as a
legislative grant of the power to suspend imposition of sentence without restriction.
The Supreme Court, in Helton, felt that the statute might be
applied not only to sentences withheld for judicial purposes of a
proper temporary nature but also to sentences withheld illegally in
contravention of the probation law of 1941. In the same case, while
discussing the district court's decision in Bateh, the Court's only
comment concerning the statute was to the effect that situations of
suspension of imposition of sentence arising after the effective date
of the statute would be governed by the act.
The existence of this statute has its embarrassing aspects with
reference to present judicial thinking. According to expressions in
Bateh and Helton, the Supreme Court and the district court apparently confined the present application of the statute to sentences suspended for legitimate temporary purposes or to those suspended
illegally.
Important obstacles stand in the way of unqualified acceptance
of this position. At the time of the enactment of the statute in 1957
the subsequently repudiated practice of indefinite suspension of sentences was widely used and was still in favor with the appellate courts
of Florida. 71 By virtue of this practice, sentence was imposed after
69. State v. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
70.

FLA. STAT. §775.14 (1959).

71.

Cases cited note 65 supra.
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shockingly excessive periods of unsupervised freedom were terminated
at the will of the court. 72 This procedure was judicially repudiated
in 1958 on the basis that the 1941 probation law pre-empted a trial
court's authority to suspend a sentence for other than temporary
purposes rather than on the ground that it was illegal from its
73
inception.
It can be logically assumed that the primary and perhaps the sole
object of the five-year limitation was the elimination of unconscionably
long periods of subjection to the will of a trial court pursuant to an
indefinitely suspended sentence. This assumption is strengthened by
the fact that the probation law of 1941 limits the probationary period
to not more than two years beyond the maximum term for which
sentence can be imposed.74 The same limitation applies to the period
of suspension of sentence, since it is coextensive with the probationary
period. 7 Of course the probationary period under the 1941 law can
exceed five years, since the criminal statutes of Florida provide
maximum periods of imprisonment in excess of three years for many
crimes.7 0 These penalty provisions, considered in conjunction with
the two-year maximum extension of the probationary period, would
accomplish this result. In Helton the Supreme Court noted approvingly the limitation provided by the 1941 probation law, thus implying that it does not conflict with the five-year limitation of the
1957 statute and that the two acts are concerned with different fields
of operation.
The judicial suggestions obstructing recognition of the exclusive
application of the 1957 statute to indefinite suspension of imposition
of sentence appear to be vulnerable. The Supreme Court's idea,
expressed in Helton, that the five-year limitation applies to suspensions for temporary purposes is not entirely illogical, but it appears
to place a strained construction on the term temporary. This application of the statute is difficult to reconcile with reason. It seems
obvious that the main purpose of the law is to limit, not to grant.
To interpret its terms as granting a power to "temporarily" suspend
imposition of sentence for five years is to ignore the plain connotation
of the terminology. The primary object of the statute should not be
distorted by misconstruction.
In Helton and Bateh the Supreme Court held that when a trial
court has delayed sentencing, the power to sentence must be exercised
72. Ibid.
73. Helton v. State, 106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958); State v. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7
(1959); Batch v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958). See also Dodds v.
State, 100 So. 2d 453 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
74. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959).
75. FLA. STAT. §§948.01 (3), 948.06 (1) (1959).
76. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§948.01, 794.06, 797.01, 800.01 (1959).
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before the lapse of the maximum period that could have been imposed. When sentence is inflicted, the term cannot be projected beyond that period. These decisions were not based upon application
of the 1957 limitation statute. The Court accepted as its guiding
principle the proposition that a person who has been convicted of
an offense but is still at liberty is entitled to know when a trial court
no longer has the power to imprison him. Without applying a limitation statute, the Court set this time at the terminal date of the
maximum period of imprisonment possible under the violated statute.
It is apparent, therefore, that in the event imposition of sentence
remains suspended until expiration of the maximum period for
which it could have been imposed, the suspension becomes a nullity.
It logically follows that in such a case probation is not possible, since
there is no suspended imposition of sentence to support it, as required
under Florida law.
In the event that the trial court, after suspending sentence for
either a proper temporary purpose or an illegal purpose, decides to impose sentence before the terminal date of the maximum imprisonment
period, the five-year limitation statute must be considered. If sentence
is imposed, the statute apparently requires that imposition must take
place within five years of the time of conviction. The maximum
length of the sentence is governed by the principle underlying the
Bateh and Helton decisions,77 and it cannot extend beyond the
period for which sentence could have been imposed originally. Ap.
parently, probation also must have been granted within the five-year
period and before expiration of the sentence term. Determination of
the length of the probationary period in such a case may be troublesome. As was indicated previously, there is statutory authority for extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum term for
which the defendant might have been sentenced. Under the fiveyear limitation statute, no sentence can be imposed after expiration
of the statutory period; the suspended sentence, therefore, would cease
to have validity at the termination of this period. Without a suspended sentence, probation cannot exist. Thus the Court seems to
imply that probation preceded by suspension of sentence, for either
temporary or illegal purposes, would be terminated by the operation
of the five-year limitation statute. Although in some cases it is desirable that the maximum length of the probationary period as provided in the 1941 probation law be curtailed, the operation of the
1957 limitation statute to accomplish this objective seems entirely
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the probation law.
Another stumbling block to application of the 1957 limitation
77. Rodriguez v. State, 119 So. 2d 681
2d 458 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).

(Fla. 1960); DeLoach v. State, ill So.
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statute to the probation law appeared in 1959, when the legislature
rendered an adjudication of guilt unnecessary as a prerequisite to
the granting of probation.78 As discussed previously, a defendant who
has been placed on probation without an adjudication of guilt has
not suffered a conviction79 The limitation statute applies only when
sentence has been withheld upon conviction for a criminal offense.
Thus arises the ludicrous possibility that a trial court, after suspending the imposition of sentence, can negative the operation of
the limitation statute by not adjudicating guilt. The 1959 legislation
eventually may be of some assistance to a judicial determination of
the present status of the limitation statute.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the appellate courts, in an
effort to justify the applicability of the five-year limitation statute
to the present law of probation, have ignored the legal atmosphere in
which the statute was enacted. Although a statutory time limitation
on suspension of sentence under the probation law may be desirable,
construction of the 1957 statute to accomplish this result is not warranted. This statute should be repealed and the legislature encouraged to consider the restriction of suspended sentences in the
light of present conditions.
ConcurrentProbationand Sentence
When the law authorizes the placing of a defendant on probation,
and when his offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment,
the trial court may, in its discretion, impose a fine and place him on
probation as to imprisonment.80 This authority was granted by the
legislature to the trial courts of Florida in 1959. Before that time,
a fine could not be imposed if probation was granted, since the Supreme Court had ruled that punishment for one crime could not be
inflicted piecemeal. 8 '
Consent of the Defendant
Convicted persons will rarely choose imprisonment in preference
to probation, but such situations can arise. Some individuals might
prefer a specific term of imprisonment rather than a period of probation that may exceed the maximum possible term of imprisonment,82
the possibility of imposition of a sentence upon violation of a condition of probation, 3 and closely supervised freedom.
78. FLA. STAT. § §948.01 (1),.03 (3) (1959).
79. See note 31 supra and text pertaining thereto.
80.

FLA. STAT. §948.011 (1959).

81. Ex parte Bosso, 41 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949).
82. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959).

83. State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1957), concerns
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The Florida appellate courts apparently have not had to decide
whether a person may be placed on probation without his consent,
and it is probable that a trial court would seldom place a person on
probation against his will. However, special circumstances may cause
a court to feel impelled to release a person on probation regardless of
his wishes, particularly if imprisonment would result in undue hardship for innocent dependents or if proper detention facilities are not
available.
The probation statute contains little to imply that a defendant
can prevail against a court's desire to place him on probation. The
decision apparently is within the discretion of the court, 84 with one

possible exception. If a defendant objects to probation and the court
subsequently orders that the probationary period shall run beyond
the term for which a sentence could have been imposed, the defendant may be able to successfully contend that the court has illegally
extended the sentence by subterfuge, particularly since probation is
considered to be punishment.85

It is arguable that no useful purpose is served by placing a defendant on probation against his wishes, since the probability of violation and subsequent imposition of sentence would be increased.
However, there is a good chance that violation by the unwilling probationer will be discouraged by social and personal forces.
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

The court having original jurisdiction in a criminal case determines
the terms and conditions of probation and may rescind or modify
them at any time during the probationary period8s
A non-exclusive list of conditions of probation that a court is
authorized to impose upon a defendant is provided by statute.8 Among
these conditions are requirements that a probationer shall avoid injurious or vicious habits, avoid persons or places of disreputable or
harmful character, report to the probation supervisor as directed, permit the supervisor to visit him at his home or elsewhere, work faithfully at a suitable employment in so far as is possible, remain within
a specified place, make reparation or restitution to an aggrieved
party for damage or loss caused by his offense, and support his legal
dependents to the best of his ability.
a person who was placed on probation for a specified period of 7 years. The probation order was revoked on the last day of the 7-year period. Prior violations
of conditions of probation were brought to the attention of the trial court for
the first time on this day.
84. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (3) (1959).
85. See Ex parte Bosso, 41 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949).
86. FLA. STAT. §948.03 (2) (1959).
87.

FLA. STAT. §948.03 (1) (1959).
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The legislature has specified at least one mandatory condition of
probation. A violator of the Child Molester Law cannot be placed
on probation until the court is satisfied that he will receive regular
psychiatric or psychotherapeutic help, and the individual counseling
the defendant must make written reports to the probation officer
and to the the court at least every six months.,"
As a matter of practice, some courts adopt the conditions used
by the Florida Parole Commission in the supervision of parolees, with
variations suitable to the individual probationer's situation. At times,
however, a court may be inclined to specify no more than one condition to be met by the probationer in addition to the requirement of
lawful conduct. Such a condition usually is designed to prevent a repetition of the particular crime for which probation is contemplated.
Supervision
The Florida Parole Commission is required by statute to supervise probationers.89 This commission consists of three members appointed by the board of commissioners of state institutions from a list
of eligible persons who have been subjected to investigation and written examination. 90 Each member serves for a term of six years9' and
is subject to reappointment. 9- The headquarters of the commission is
in Tallahassee, 93 and there are twenty-six district offices strategically
located throughout the state.94 These offices are manned by supervisors
selected by the commission from a list of eligible persons derived from
competitive examinations testing knowledge of penology, social welfare, or correctional supervision.9 '
The commission, acting through the supervisors, is required to
keep informed as to the conduct, habits, associates, employment,
recreations, and location of probationers. -" A supervisor must deliver
and explain to each probationer a certified copy of the terms of probation and any change or modification.97 When convenient, the
probationer is required to make periodic visits to the supervisor's
office. These visits are supplemented by personal contacts with the
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

FLA. STAT.

§801.08 (3) (1959).

FLA. STAT. §948.02 (2) (1959).
FLA. STAT. §§947.01,.02 (1) (1959).
FLA. STAT. §947.03 (1) (1959).

FLA.

STAT..

§947.02 (2) (1959).

FLA. STAT. §947.04 (2) (1959).
FLORIDA PAROLE COMM'N, TWENTIErH ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1961).

95. FLA. STAT. §947.09 (1959). According to the annual report of the Florida
Parole Commission, 84 of its personnel were engaged in supervisory work at the
close of 1960.
96. FLA. STAT. §948.02 (1) (1959).
97. Ibid.
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probationer in his home or at other appropriate places. The object
of these personal contacts is rehabilitation, and the supervisor makes
every effort to prevent embarrassment to the probationer during the
period of supervision, cooperating with him in determining convenient places, times, and methods of contact. The supervisor does not
divulge the fact that a person is on probation except when necessary,
and seeks to establish a relationship of mutual confidence with the
probationer as soon as possible. Reports that include a statement
of the financial status of the probationer are usually required on a
monthly basis, and the supervisor makes periodic progress reports to
the parole commission and to the court.
In addition to the supervision of persons placed on probation by
trial courts in Florida, the parole commission also supervises probationers transferred from other states in conformity with compacts with
forty-seven states and the United States Government. 98 Under these
agreements, a person convicted and placed on probation in one state
may be allowed to reside in another state if he can obtain employment
there and if either the probationer or his family are residents of the
receiving state.9 9 Apparently the receiving state is bound to accept
a probationer who is a resident of that state or has a family residing
there. In all other cases the receiving state may exercise its discretion. 00 The Florida Parole Commission is governed in the supervision
of probationers from other states by the same standards that prevail
for its own probations. 101
LENGTH OF PROBATIONARY PERIOD

The trial court apparently is not bound to place a person on probation for any set period of time.10 2 However, it cannot order probation
98. FLA. STAT. §949.07 (1959). Under the authority of FLA. STAT. §949.071,
passed in 1957, compacts may be made with any of the 50 states, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. In addition, compacts may be
made with any other jurisdiction provided they are made in conformity with
4 U.S.C. §111 (b) (1958), as added by Pub. L. No. 970, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. ch. 941
(1956). 24 FLA. STAT. ANN. §949.07 (Supp. 1960) contains a list of states that have
adopted the compact.
99. FLA. STAT. §949.07 (1) (a) (1959). A resident of the receiving state is defined
as "one who has been an actual inhabitant of such state continuously for more
than one year prior to his coming to the sending state and has not resided within
the sending state more than six continuous months immediately preceding the
commission of the offense for which he has been convicted." Id. §949.07 (1) (b).
100. In Florida the parole commission makes these decisions. See FLA. STAT.
§949.08 (1959).
101. FLA. STAT. §949.07 (2) (1959).
102. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959). See text at notes 66-73 supra for a discussion of
the possible effect of the 1957 5-year limitation statute on the length of the probationary period.
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for any period that exceeds by two years the maximum term for which
the defendant could be sentenced. 10 3 Thus, if a person is adjudged
guilty of a crime for which the maximum period of imprisonment set
by statute is five years, the court may order probation for seven years.
It is common practice among Florida trial courts to specify the
length of the probationary period at the time probation is granted.104
In many cases the court prescribes a period that is less than the legal
maximum, presumably for the commendable purpose of motivating
the probationer to strive toward rehabilitation. This maneuver does
not legally bind the court, however. The trial judge has statutory
authority to order an extension of the probationary period within the
maximum limit set by statute whenever it appears that further
supervision would be beneficial to the probationer or to society. 05
A practical advantage to the probationer in having his probationary
period definitized is the inhibitory moral factor tending to deter the
court from lengthening the period.
The proper procedure in granting probation is to suspend imposition of sentence rather than to pronounce sentence and suspend
its execution. 0 It is by no means clear, however, that all trial courts
follow the proper procedure. Suspension of the execution of a pronounced sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements and apparently is a nullity. Presumably such a procedure would not be
utilized by a court unless the probationary period was deemed to be
coextensive with the suspended execution of the pronounced sentence. The execution of sentence, therefore, would have to remain
suspended as long as the probationer adhered to the conditions of
his probation. In the event of violation and revocation of probation,
the court is not bound by the previously pronounced sentence, since
it has statutory authority to impose any sentence it might have
originally imposed prior to placing the defendant on probation.107
Thus it appears that even though no one complains of the trial court's
adoption of this improper procedure, there is little to justify such
judicial behavior.
In granting authority to the trial courts to extend the probation103. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959). The terminology of this statute depicts an
anomaly when compared with §948.01 (1), which contemplates that a defendant
found guilty of a crime punishable by life imprisonment may be granted probation. This effect was accomplished by the 1959 amendment to FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1),
which left only the defendant found guilty of a capital offense ineligible for
probation.
104. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959) seems to imply that this procedure is acceptable,
yet clearly indicates its non-binding effect.
105. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959); see State ex rel. Lee v. Coker, 80 So. 2d 462
(Fla. 1955), in which the original period was extended.
106. Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
107. FLa. STAT. §948.06 (1) (1959).
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ary period to no more than two years beyond the term for which
sentence could be imposed, the legislature apparently did not place
sufficient emphasis upon the fact that probation presupposes reasonable confidence in the defendant's rehabilitative potentialities. The
period of probation should be determined by the length of time required to give the supervisory authorities ample opportunity to
ascertain whether the court's confidence was justified. The period
for which an institutional commitment may be made has little relevance here. It is no secret that the penalty provisions of a criminal
statute often are the result of legislative arbitrariness, compromise,
and thoughtlessnessOs Use of the penalty provision as a major factor
in determining the maximum probationary period reduces the possibility of accomplishing the objective of probation.
A reasonable approach to this problem is recommended by the
American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code. 10 9 The Institute
is of the opinion that a maximum period of five years for felonies
and two years for misdemeanors is adequate to determine whether
probation will succeed." 0 There is little doubt that an unduly extended period of probation may deter rather than encourage rehabilitation. If a substantially longer period than that recommended
by the Institute is deemed necessary in a given case, the probability
of failure of probation dictates the propriety of imposition of sentence.
Implementation of the Institute's recommendation in Florida
would be complicated by the differences between the Florida and the
Model Penal Code definitions of misdemeanor and felony. In the
absence of specific legislative designation of a particular criminal
offense as a felony or a misdemeanor,"" the distinction between the
two classifications of crimes in Florida is governed by the penalty
provided. If the offense is punishable by death or imprisonment in
the state prison, it is properly designated a felony; otherwise, it is
a misdemeanor."' 2 Except for capital crimes, which are always classified as felonies, the felony-misdemeanor distinction under the Model
Penal Code' 3 is based on differences in the length of maximum sen108. Clark, The Significance of Penalty Provisions of the Florida Criminal

Statutes,9 U. FLA. L. REv. 289 (1956).
109. MODEL PENAL CODE §301.2 (1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE §30.2, comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
111. Nation v. State, 154 Fla. 337, 17 So. 2d 521 (1944).
112. FLA. CONsr. art. XVI, §25; FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1959).

113.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§1.05 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). According to this

section, a crime is to be designated a felony if it is specifically so designated in
the code or if it is punishable by death or imprisonment for a term that, apart
from an extended term, is in excess of one year. A distinction is drawn in the code
between an ordinary term and an extended term, the latter contemplating a
longer period of imprisonment in various situations, as in the case of a per-
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tences. If a statute provides a maximum penalty exceeding one year,
the crime involved is a felony; otherwise, it is a misdemeanor."'
Since Florida's conception of a felony is not governed by the length
of an authorized sentence of imprisonment, it is possible that a misdemeanor may be punishable by a longer period of imprisonment
than a felony."1 It is therefore apparent that the Institute's recommendation, if utilized in Florida, could not be based strictly on the
felony-misdemeanor distinction.
The recommendation has merit for Florida, however, even though
an adjustment is necessary. This adjustment might be accomplished
by setting the maximum probationary period at five years for all
crimes punishable by imprisonment in excess of five years, without
regard to the felony-misdemeanor distinction. The probationary
period for all Florida crimes punishable by a lesser period of imprisonment could be set at two years. These adjustments would improve the probation law of this state by setting a more desirable stage
for rehabilitation and by decreasing the opportunity for abuse of the
probation process.
The expiration of the probationary period has important implications. Assuming that there has been no valid revocation, upon
termination of the period the probationer is entitled to be released
from probation; and he cannot be sentenced for the crime for which
he was tried.lI 6 The period terminates after the maximum time
specified by the statute has run or prior thereto by order of the trial
court.
VIOLATION

Arrest and Bail
Whenever within the period of probation there is reasonable
ground to believe that a probationer has violated his probation in
a material respect, any parole or probation officer may arrest him
without a warrant of arrest and return him to the court granting
the probation; or any committing magistrate may issue a warrant of
arrest upon presentation of an affidavit by one having knowledge of
the facts. The warrant is returnable before the court granting the
probation."1
sistent offender or a professional criminal. Id. §§6.07, 6.09, 7.03-.04.
114. See note 113 supra.
115. E.g., FLA. STAT. §795.01 (1959) provides for a maximum period of imprisonment of one year in the state prison (a felony); id. §548.01 provides for a
maximum period of 5 years, without specifying the place of imprisonment. The
crime is thereby a misdemeanor. Id. §775.06.
116. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1959).
117. FLA. STAT. §948.06 (1959).
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The Supreme Court of Florida has expressed itself several times
with reference to the materiality of a violation that warrants revocation of probation. A condition requiring the probationer "to live
and remain at liberty without violation of any law" may be violated
by a serious infraction of a city ordinance. 118 Minor offenses, such as
overparking, are not considered material to this condition of probation; but convictions for more serious violations of city ordinances,
such as possession and sale of lottery tickets, are sufficient grounds for
revocation. 1 9
Pending the hearing to determine whether probation should be
continued or revoked, the trial court may commit the probationer
to jail or release him with or without bail. If the court considers a
hearing unnecessary because of an obvious lack of evidence that the
probationer has not violated a condition of the probation, it can
1 20
dismiss the charge.
These provisions for arrest and bail are subject to qualification
in a situation involving a probationer who has been transferred from
another state for supervision in Florida. The pertinent statute provides:121
"That duly accredited officers of a sending state may at
all times enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any person on probation or parole. For that purpose no
formalities will be required other than establishing the authority of the officer and the identity of the person to be retaken.
All legal requirements to obtain extradition of fugitives from
justice are hereby expressly waived on the part of the states
party thereto, as to such persons. The decision of the sending
state to retake a person on probation or parole shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state;
provided however, that if at the time when a state seeks to retake a probationer or parolee there should be pending against
him within the receiving state any criminal charge, or he would
be suspected of having committed within such state a criminal
offense, he shall not be retaken without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or from imprisonment for such offense."
These statutory provisions create doubt as to whether a supervisor may arrest such a probationer for any purpose other than as
a step toward returning him to the sending state.
118. Caston v. State, 58 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1952).
119. Ibid.
120. FLA. STAT. §948.06 (1) (1959).
121. FLA. STAT. §949.07 (3) (1959).
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The Hearing
Due process of law requires that a hearing be accorded a person
charged with violation of a condition of probation. 122 This hearing
is informal and is not conducted according to trial procedure. Its
purpose is to satisfy the conscience of the court as to whether a condition has been materially violated.123 A secondary purpose is to
give the probationer a chance to answer the charges against him.
Accordingly, evidence that could be suppressed at a formal trial as
having been obtained by illegal search and seizure may be considered
by the court in determining whether the condition of the probation
2
has been violated. 4
The extent to which the trial court may use such evidence is uncertain. The Florida Supreme Court expressly approved its use in
a case in which the illegally seized property only supplemented other
available evidence. 125 In the event that illegally seized property is the
only evidence introduced in a hearing that results in revocation of
probation, a question of abuse of discretion by the trial court may
arise. This question has apparently never been decided on the
appellate level in Florida.
The probationer is entitled to be heard in his own behalf and
to be represented by counsel at the hearing. 12 After the hearing
the court may continue, modify, or revoke the probation' 27 as the
evidence may require.
Revocation
The Florida Supreme Court has spoken of the power to revoke
probation as an inherent power of the trial court;' 28 but, regardless of
whether the power is inherent in the court, it is specifically granted
by statute.2 9 If probation is revoked, the court is required to adjudge the defendant guilty if no judgment has been made previously. 30
122. State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1957).
123. Ibid.
124. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947). Although this case involved a hearing in connection with an alleged violation of a condition of a suspended sentence in a situation in which the court did not use probation, the
Supreme Court of Florida quoted it with seeming approval in State ex rel. Ard
v. Shelby, supra note 122, a case involving probation, in so far as the point under
discussion is concerned.
125. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947).
126. FLA. STAT. §948.06 (1) (1959).
127. Ibid.
128. Bronson v. State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So. 2d 873 (1941).
129. FLA. STAT. §948.06 (1) (1959).
130. FLA. STAT. §948.06 (1) (1959).
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Any sentence that might have been imposed before the defendant
was placed on probation may then be pronounced.' 3 '
Sentence may not be imposed if the revocation is not valid. An
affidavit charging violation of a condition cannot be the basis of a
valid revocation if it is made after termination of the probationary
period,132 nor may a revocation be ordered arbitrarily. In Ard v.
State' 33 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a felony after being
promised by the prosecutor that he would be granted probation.
On the recommendation of the prosecutor, the trial court entered
an order placing the defendant on probation for seven years. Five
years later the probation was revoked to enable the successor of the
original prosecutor to use the conviction as one of the two felony
convictions necessary as a basis for the prosecution of the defendant
as a second offender. No claim was made that the defendant had
violated a condition of his probation; he was convicted as a second
offender. On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the trial court
was ordered to restore the defendant to probation. The appellate
court indicated that an extended discussion of the law of probation
was unnecessary to support its decision. The action in the court below
obviously was obnoxious to the appellate court's sense of justice.
Time spent on probation cannot be considered as part of the sentence imposed after probation is revoked."3 But as a practical matter,
a court, in determining the length of the sentence, may consider the
fact that the defendant has been on probation.
LEGAL PROCEDURES AvAILABLE TO A PROBATIONER

Appeal
Placing a person on probation does not deprive him of his right
to take advantage of legal means to protect his interests. An order
granting probation under the 1941 probation law may be appealed in
the same manner and with the same scope and effect as if from a
judgment of conviction. 35 This authority, granted by statute in
1959, was apparently rendered necessary by another 1959 act that permits a trial court to place a defendant on probation without first adjudging him guilty1 36 The terminology of the two statutes created a
doubt as to the legal propriety of an adjudication of guilt prior to
131. Ibid.
132. State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (1957). Revocation may follow
termination of the probationary period if the affidavit is made prior thereto.

133. Ard v. State, 91 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1956).
134.
135.
136.

FLA. STAT. §948.06 (2) (1959).
FLA. STAT. §924.06 (2) (1959).
FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1) (1959).
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the granting of probation under the 1941 probation law. Originally,
probation could be granted only if the defendant had not been adjudicated guilty. The 1961 Legislature resolved all doubt by clearly
leaving the decision within the discretion of the trial court.137
When an adjudication of guilt has been rendered and probation
has been granted, the defendant stands convicted by virtue of the
judgment238 The question then arises whether he should appeal
from the final judgment of conviction rather than from the order
granting probation. The Florida statutes provide for appeal from
39
a final judgment of conviction when probation has not been granted"
14 0
and from an order of probation granted under the probation law,
but in the latter case the statute contemplates that no judgment of
conviction shall have been entered. Since the 1961 Legislature clearly
established that probation may be granted with or without an adjudication of guilt, 4 ' the necessity for further legislative clarification of
the proper appellate procedure becomes apparent.
The right of appeal is available in another situation. A probationer may appeal an order revoking probation, but only the pro42
ceedings after the order of probation may be considered.'
Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus proceedings are available to a person on probation.143 The probationer is considered sufficiently restrained to
warrant testing the validity of the probation order by such proceedings.
Pardon
The Constitution of Florida authorizes the pardon board to grant
a pardon only after a conviction.14 A defendant properly adjudged
guilty of a crime has suffered a conviction, 145 and there is little reason
to doubt that he may be granted a pardon even though he is on
probation. This is not so obvious in the case of a probationer who
has not been adjudged guilty. Such a person should not be considered
137. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-498.
138. Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1958); Weathers v. State, 56 So. 2d
536 (Fla. 1952); Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930).
139. FLA. STAT. §924.06 (1) (1959).
140. FLA. STAT. §924.06 (2) (1959).
141. FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1) (1959).
142. FLA. STAT. §924.06 (3) (1959).
143. Ex parte Bosso, 41 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949); Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 586,
15 So. 2d 293 (1943).
144. FLA. CONsT. art. IV, §12.
145. Weathers v. State, 56 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
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as having been convicted of the crime involved, since a judgment is
required for a conviction. If this were not true there would have been
little reason for the legislature to remove the necessity of an adjudication of guilt as a prerequisite to probation. As was pointed out
previously, the legislature presumably was motivated by the desire
to save for the probationer certain privileges that he would forfeit
by suffering a conviction. Elimination of the necessity for an adjudication of guilt prior to probation, thereby obviating a conviction,
apparently was employed because some of the privileges that the
legislature desired to preserve for a defendant possibly are forfeited
by self-executing constitutional provisions. This procedure avoided
the necessity of amending the constitution and numerous statutes.
The legislature, while providing for probation without a conviction, also granted the right to appeal from an order of probation as if
a conviction had transpired. 146 Thus, in spite of the absence of a
conviction, the legislature has recognized that a finding of guilt by
plea or verdict results in a "stain of guilt" that can be removed by
a reversal of the finding by an appellate court. Whether a pardon
may also be used to remove this stain of guilt cannot be answered
decisively.
It appears that a trial court could easily resolve this problem by
adjudicating a probationer guilty if pardon is considered imminent.
The fallacy in this assumption does not lie in the court's inability
to follow this course, the legality of which is assumed, but in its
possible disinclination to do so. Instances of a trial judge actively
opposing the pardon of a defendant found guilty in his court are not
rare. Such a court could hardly be expected to facilitate the granting
of a pardon by adjudicating guilt.
Assuming that judicial construction of conviction as used in all
constitutional and statutory provisions for forfeitures is the same
as when it is used to describe the result of adjudication of guilt,47
a trial judge creates a paradox by not entering a judgment prior to
granting probation. He- thereby preserves for the defendant certain
rights and privileges that would be lost by virtue of a conviction, but
at the same time deprives him of that which many defendants probably consider more precious - the chance and hope for a pardon.
Thus the use of probation might defeat the primary purpose for
which it was created by deterring rather than promoting the rehabilitation of the probationer. Whether the legislature intended this
result is debatable, but of more basic concern is the resulting conception of eligibility for pardons. The judiciary may be unable to
reconcile a system by which an appellate court is empowered to re146.
147.

FLA. STAT. §924.06(2) (1959).
Weathers v. State, 56 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
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move a stain born of criminal activity but the pardon board is powerless to grant a pardon for the same offense.
Forfeitureof Rights and Privileges
Conviction for a felony, and possibly for some misdemeanors, causes
forfeiture of certain privileges under Florida law.14s Among these
are the so-called civil rights of holding an elective or appointive office
of honor, profit, or trust; 149 voting;1 ,o and serving as a witnesss' or as
a juror. 152 Conviction for a felony also results in forfeiture of the
privilege of possessing certain types of firearms.'53
The privilege of engaging in certain professions may be withdrawn after a conviction for specified criminal acts. Physicians, 5 4
dentists,1" pharmacists,156 osteopaths,15 7 chiropractors, 5 8 and naturopaths"59 are subject to statutory regulation.
Presumably, the legislature was primarily concerned with civil
rights, and to some extent with the other privileges, when it granted
a trial court the authority to place a defendant on probation without
first adjudicating him guilty. Without an adjudication of guilt the
defendant is not convicted of the crime of which he was found guilty
by plea or verdict, and thus he does not suffer loss of privileges. 16o
148. E.g., FLA. STAT. §97.041 (1959) prohibits a person from voting until
restored to his civil rights if he has been convicted of bribery, perjury, larceny,
or any infamous crime. According to State ex rel. Jordan v. Buckman, 18 Fla.
267 (1881), a person convicted of petit larceny, a misdemeanor, is deprived of
his civil right of suffrage until restored to his civil rights. The Attorney General
of Florida in 1953 was of the opinion that this holding represents the law of
Florida even though it was recognized that the case was decided prior to adoption
of the present constitution of Florida. REP. ATT'y GEN. FLA. 72 (1953). Although
an opinion of the attorney general is only advisory in nature, if this ruling is
representative of the actual law of Florida, presumably the commission of any
crime listed in the Florida Constitution or a Florida statute that results in loss
of a civil right is operative regardless of whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor.
149. FLA. STAT. §783.01 (1959).
150. FLA. CONsT. art. VI, §4.
151. The loss of this right is confined to a conviction for perjury. FLA. STAT.
§§90.07,.08 (1959).
152. FLA. STAT. §40.01 (2) (1959).
153. FLA. STAT. §790.23 (1959).
154. FLA. STAT. §458.12 (1959).
155. FLA. STAT. §466.24 (1959).
156. FLA. STAT. §465.101 (1959).
157. FLA. STAT. §459.14 (1959).
158. FLA. STAT. §460.13 (1959).
159. FLA. STAT. §461.14 (1959).
160. See Note, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 102, 103 (1959), for an opinion to the contrary.
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This technique rests upon commendable motives, and it may contribute materially to the reclamation of lives for the good of society.
Little valid criticism can be leveled at this departure from tradition
in the treatment of a person found guilty of a crime,G1 but beyond
this point complications arise.
The possible effect on the power of the pardon board of granting
probation without an adjudication of guilt has been discussed. Another problem involves the probationer who is convicted of another
crime after having successfully completed a term of probation that
was imposed without an adjudication of guilt. The statutes dealing
with multiple offenders' 62 and habitual criminals 163 provide for more
severe penalties for repeated violations of the criminal laws. It therefore becomes vital to determine the nature of the finding of guilt
in a case in which probation has been granted. If such a finding
is not treated as the equivalent of a conviction, it cannot be considered in determining whether the defendant is a multiple or habitual offender.
Present Florida law seems to protect the former probationer in a
case of this kind. There is no valid reason why a person who has been
treated benevolently by the law in order to facilitate his rehabilitation
should be granted the right to use that same law to the prejudice of
society. If repetition of criminal activity warrants progressively more
severe penalties, the former probationer who follows this course of
conduct should be subject to the multiple-offender statutes. The
state, as well as the defendant, is entitled to justice; and statutory
revision is needed.
There is another situation in which justice demands that the probationer should not be permitted to take advantage of the technical
lack of a conviction after guilt has been established. Evidence of a
prior conviction may be important for the impeachment of a witness
in a civil or a criminal trial. 64 If a person has been found guilty of
a crime and placed on probation without an adjudication of guilt,
it is manifestly unjust to deny a correct appraisal of his credibility
as a witness on the highly technical ground that he has suffered no
prior conviction. In the interest of consistency, immediate legislative
action is needed to close this apparent loophole in the law.
161. See FLA. STAT. §775.13 (1959), a 1957 statute, in which the legislature
indicated its interest in rehabilitation of convicted persons by excepting probationers, among others, from the operation of the law requiring the registration of
convicted felons.
162.
FLA. STAT. §775.09 (1959) provides a heavier penalty for a second conviction of a felony.
163. FLA. STAT. §775.10 (1959), commonly called the habitual criminal statute,
provides a heavier penalty for a fourth conviction of a felony.
164. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). See also Note, 13 U. FLA.
L. REv. 372 (1960).
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CONCLUSION

Probation as administered in Florida is a significant step toward
deterring criminal activity through rehabilitation, and its wise use
will greatly benefit society as well as the individuals concerned. The
initial responsibility for the success of this process of human reclamation lies with the trial judge, who must select the potentially good
citizens for probation. The parole commission then assumes the important task of supervising and assisting the probationer in his efforts
to regain respectability.
Although the legislature has provided the framework for an
adequate system of probation, some of the statutory and case law of
Florida interferes with the attainment of a completely satisfactory procedure. The ensuing suggestions are directed toward the elimination
of these handicaps.
1. The legislature should expressly prohibit suspension of the
execution of a pronounced sentence.
2. The legislature shall specify that suspensions of imposition of
sentence must be for legitimate temporary purposes only and that a
suspension in excess of two years shall not be deemed temporary unless caused by the intentional act of the defendant.
3. The 1957 statute providing for a five-year limitation on withheld
sentences should be repealed; and a statute should be passed providing that no defendant can be sentenced or placed on probation
after his sentence has been suspended for more than two years beyond
the date of the finding of guilt, unless the excessive delay is caused by
the intentional act of the defendant.
4. The statute providing for appeal from an order of probation
granted under the probation law should be amended to permit an
appeal from a judgment of conviction when probation is granted.
5. The present felony-misdemeanor distinction should be abandoned. The Constitution of Florida and pertinent statutes should
be amended to define a felony as any criminal offense specifically
designated as a felony or made punishable by death or imprisonment
exceeding one year. All other crimes should be considered misdemeanors.
6. The legislature should specify the privileges that are preserved
when the trial court refrains from adjudicating guilt. These should
be limited to holding elective office, voting, and serving as a juror.
7. The statute providing for loss of the right to serve as a witness
after a conviction for perjury should be repealed. 165
8. Legislation should be enacted to clarify the law concerning
165. See Lefcourt v. Streit, 91 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1956), for a treatment of the
American law on this subject.
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probation for persons convicted of crimes punishable only by fine.
9. The legislature should consider setting maximum probationary
periods consistent with the principle that if rehabilitation is deemed
impossible within a reasonable time, sentence should be imposed. A
five-year maximum is suggested for all crimes punishable by imprisonment in excess of five years, with a two-year maximum for those
punishable by imprisonment for less than five years.
10. There should be specific statutory authority to grant probation when the defendant has violated a statute that provides a sentence
of imprisonment for not less than a specified period.
11. The pardon board should be authorized to consider for pardon a probationer who has not been adjudged guilty. Trial courts
should be required to enter a judgment of guilty when notified by
the board that the probationer will be pardoned.
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